Product Liability and Food in Washington State: What Constitutes Manufacturing? by Ferguson, Alex
Product Liability and Food in Washington State:
What Constitutes Manufacturing?
Alex Fergusont
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year in the United States, an estimated 76 million instances
of foodborne illness occur, resulting in 5,000 deaths. ' In 2007 alone, the
United States Department of Agriculture estimated that one foodborne
bacterium, Salmonella, cost injured victims over $2.5 billion.2 With
America's ever-increasing reliance on pre-packaged and convenience
food products, food manufacturers' liability for foodborne illness-related
lawsuits continues to grow.
Perhaps because of the ubiquitous nature of food as a commodity,
food-related lawsuits have, in recent years, garnered considerable media
attention.3 Among the first notable foodborne illness-related lawsuits to
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1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Enteric Diseases Epidemiology and Laboratory
Branches, http://www.cdc.gov/enterics (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
2. USDA Economic Research Service, Foodborne Illness Cost Calculator: Salmonella,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Foodbomelllness/salmIntro.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) ("The
United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service estimates that the annual eco-
nomic cost of salmonellosis-the illness caused by the Salmonella bacterium-is $2,544,394,334
(2007 dollars). This estimate is for all cases of salmonellosis, not just foodbome cases. The esti-
mate includes medical costs due to illness, the cost (value) of time lost from work due to nonfatal
illness, and the cost (value) of premature death. It excludes a number of other potential costs, such
as those associated with chronic complications, disutility for nonfatal illness, pain and suffering,
travel, childcare, etc.").
3. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, 153 Hepatitis Cases Are Traced to Frozen Imported Straw-
berries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at AI; Annys Shin & Mary Otto, 3 Children in Md. Sick with E.
colifrom Spinach, Hagerstown Woman's Death Is Investigated, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 3006, at Al ;
Peter Sigal, Montco Processor Issues Largest Recall: The Plant in Franconia Twp. Was Contami-
nated with Listeria, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 14, 2002, at B 1; Elizabeth Weise & Julie Schmit, Health
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 32:741
attract national media attention were those stemming from a 1993
E. coli outbreak associated with the Jack in the Box restaurant chain.5
Affecting mostly consumers in Washington, the Jack in the Box E. coli
outbreak left more than 600 victims sick and four children dead.6 The
source of the outbreak was eventually traced to tainted hamburger meat
manufactured and sold to the restaurant chain by one of its suppliers.7
In the ensuing years, notable foodborne illness cases ranged from a
1996 E. coli outbreak resulting from unpasteurized Odwalla brand fruit
juice8 to a 2006 E. coli outbreak resulting from tainted spinach.9 The
latter outbreak, caused by fresh spinach and spinach-containing products
processed by Natural Selections Foods, 10 left 205 consumers ill and three
dead. 1 The Food and Drug Administration traced the source of the con-
taminated spinach to four fields located in central California. 12 Although
the source was identified, consumers felt defenseless against the continu-
ing threat of contaminated food products.' 3  In the words of a husband
whose wife suffered kidney damage after consuming the tainted spinach,
Risks May Reach Far Beyond Reported Victims: More Than 20,000 Could Be Affected, the CDC
Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2009, at IA (describing salmonella contamination in peanut butter).
4. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Escherichia
coli, http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/dfbmd/disease listing/stecgi.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). The
CDC summarizes information on the E. coli bacterium as follows:
Escherichia coli (abbreviated as E. coli) are a large and diverse group of bacteria.
Although most strains of E. coli are harmless, others can make you sick. Some kinds of
E. coli can cause diarrhea, while others cause urinary tract infections, respiratory illness
and pneumonia, and other illnesses. Still other kinds of E. coli are used as markers for
water contamination-so you might hear about E. coli being found in drinking water,
which are not themselves harmful, but indicate the water is contaminated. It does get a
bit confusing-even to microbiologists.
Id.
5. See Bob Van Voris, Jack in the Box Ends E. coli Suits, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A8.
6.Id.
7. See Jack in the Box's Worst Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, § 1, at 35, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htmlres=9FOCE7DB I53CF935A35751COA965958260&sec-
&spon=.
8. John Henkel, Juice Maker Fined Record Amount for E. Coli-Tainted Product, 33 FDA
CONSUMER 34, 34-35 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/departs/1999/199 irs.html.
9. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Finalizes Report on 2006 Spinach Outbreak
(Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW01593.html [herein-
after FDA Spinach Report].
10. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Questions and
Answers about E. coli 0157:H7 Outbreak from Fresh Spinach (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2006/september/qa.htm.
11. FDA Spinach Report, supra note 9.
12. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodbome E. coli 0157:H7
Outbreak in Spinach (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/
NEW01489.html.
13. See Herb Weisbaum, E. coli Aftermath: Where is the Accountability?, MSNBC, Oct. 31,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 5378334/.
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"I'm just so terribly angry that a contaminated product like this could be
put out on the open market and affect so many people. There has to be
some responsibility here."' 4
Public demands for corporate responsibility for injuries caused by
merchantable goods, such as consumer food products, are at the root of
modem product liability law. 15 In contrast to the traditional manufac-
turer defenses of caveat emptor and privity of contract available in the
nineteenth century, manufacturers of defective products in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries have been held strictly liable for the injuries
caused by their products. 16
Washington, the jurisdiction of primary focus in this Comment,
follows the modem approach of holding product manufacturers strictly
liable for injuries to consumers caused by defective products.' 7 Unfortu-
nately for consumers injured by unsafe food in Washington, the state's
courts have inconsistently interpreted the definition of "manufacturer"
contained in the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA). 18 Because a
non-manufacturing seller can be held liable only for negligence, whether
the seller of an unsafe food product is a manufacturer under the WPLA
critically impacts the seller's liability. Thus, without consistent statutory
interpretations, both food producers and consumers face unpredictable
trial outcomes and costly litigation.
To address the courts' inconsistent interpretations of the WPLA's
manufacturer definition, this Comment proposes applying a test that
assesses manufacturer liability not only by the apparent physical changes
an entity makes to a product, but also by the increased monetary value
the entity adds to the product. This approach comports with the intent of
the WPLA and Washington common law standards, and leads to highly
predictable trial results.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of Washington's
product liability law, from early twentieth century theories of implied
warranty to the mid-twentieth century adoption of the pro-consumer
strict liability standards of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Part III examines manufacturer liability in Washington after the
1981 adoption of the WPLA. Part IV analyzes the various approaches
Washington courts currently use to determine manufacturer liability, spe-
14. Id.
15. See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 956-57
(2007).
16. Id. at 968.
17. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030 (2008); Garza v. McCain Foods, Inc., 124 Wash. App.
908, 916, 103 P.3d 848, 852 (2004) ("The [Washington product liability] act imposes strict liability
on any manufacturer of a defective product for resulting injuries.").
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
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cifically focusing on the contradictory outcomes of Almquist v. Finley
School Dist. No. 5319 and Hadley v. Spokane Produce, Inc. Part V
examines an alternative approach for determining manufacturer liability
found in Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co.,21 which uses the "relevant
product" framework already present in the WPLA. Part VI proposes a
workable test that resolves the inconsistencies in the approach used by
the Almquist and Hadley courts by using the Washburn approach as a
reference point. This proposed test, named the "value-added" test, will
provide Washington courts with a consistent standard to apply when
defining manufacturer liability under the WPLA. Part VII concludes by
addressing potential concerns about the value-added test and its confor-
mity with the WPLA.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW IN WASHINGTON
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, U.S. law adhered to the
principles of caveat emptor and privity of contract.22 The rule of caveat
emptor, literally meaning "let the buyer beware," holds the buyer of a
product responsible for both obvious and hidden defects in the product.23
Privity of contract restricts those injured by defective products to bring-
ing actions against only those persons with whom the injured party had a
direct contractual relationship. 24 These two principles, rooted in seven-
teenth century English law,25 reflected the early U.S. court system's
commitment to individualism and free enterprise.2 6
Prior to the early twentieth century, Washington courts also
followed the rules of caveat emptor and privity of contract. As the
Washington Supreme Court explained in Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
27
[i]t has been accepted as a general rule that a manufacturer is not li-
able to any person other than his immediate vendee; that the action
is necessarily one upon an implied or express warranty, and that
without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; that each pur-
chaser must resort to his immediate vendor.
28
19. 114 Wash. App. 395, 57 P.3d 1191 (2002).
20. No. 03-2-01520-7 (Spokane County Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (on file with author).
21. 120 Wash. 2d 246, 840 P.2d 860 (1992).
22. Owen, supra note 15, at 961. This development coincided with the start of the Industrial
Age in the United States.
23. Id. at 958.
24. Id. at 963.
25. Id. at 958-59.
26. Id. at 961; see also Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (holding that
privity of contract must be upheld as a matter of public policy to limit manufacturer liability).
27. 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
28. Id. at 624, 135 P. at 634.
[Vol. 32:741
What Constitutes Manufacturing
The Mazetti Court, however, also recognized an important emerging
trend in the modem American manufacturer/consumer relationship:
consumers in the early twentieth century were increasingly relying on the
safety of canned and already-prepared food products. 29 The Court stipu-
lated that a consumer, relying on a company that adverts itself as a
manufacturer and seller of pure food articles, cannot be expected to
detect impurities in food from a seemingly flawless can.3° In other
words, there was no way for the buyer to beware; buyers had to trust in
the quality of the food.
The focus in Mazetti on packaged food products logically flowed
from a long-standing exception to the privity of contract rule that
allowed direct consumer actions against manufacturers of medicines.31
The court explained: "Direct actions are allowed in [medicine manufac-
ture] cases because the manufacturer of medicines is generally shrouded
in mystery, and sometimes, if not generally, [medicines] contain poisons
which may produce injurious results., 32 Recognizing that food-product
consumers, like medicine consumers, cannot "chemically analyze" a pre-
packaged food product before buying or consuming it, the Mazetti Court
held that "the original act of delivering the [defective] article is wrongful,
and that every one is responsible for the natural consequences of his
wrongful acts."33 Thus, Mazetti ushered in the new standard of liability
for food-product manufacturers: "A manufacturer of food products under
modem conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in the
original packages. 34 This implied warranty was available to all con-
sumers who acquired the packaged food product through legitimate
channels of trade, including resellers and the ultimate consumers.35
For fifty-six years following Mazetti, Washington courts recognized
an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption in food prod-
ucts. 36 The premise of this implied warranty theory was that the law
imposes a special warranty (or promise) that food sold is wholesome and
fit for human consumption.37 The warranty attaches to the food product
29. See id.
30. Id. at 627-29, 135 P. at 635-36.
31. Id. at 624, 135 P. at 634; see also Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 10 S.E. 118 (Ga. 1889);
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852); Weiser v. Holzman, 33 Wash. 87, 73 P. 797 (1903).
32. Mazetti, 75 Wash. at 624, 135 P. at 634.
33. Id. at 625, 135 P. at 634 (quoting Weiser, 33 Wash. at 90-91, 73 P. at 798-99).
34. Id. at 630, 135 P. at 636.
35. Id.
36. See Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 531-32, 452 P.2d 729, 734-35 (1969)
(abandoning the implied warranty terminology following the adoption of the language detailing strict
liability for manufacturers in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
37. See Pulley v. Pac. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash. 2d 778, 783, 415 P.2d 636, 640
(1966); Nelson v. W. Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 289-90, 105 P.2d 76, 79 (1940); Flessher v.
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and, therefore, is available to anyone injured by its breach. Although
analogous to the common law standard of implied warranty in contract,
this implied warranty theory arose under tort,38 reflecting a common law
trend not just particular to Washington but also to the early twentieth-
century American judicial system as whole. 39 As the century progressed,
pro-consumer court holdings gained significant momentum.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WASHINGTON PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
By the middle of the twentieth century, the modem American
judicial path toward strict product liability in tort was in full swing.40 As
the distance between the manufacturer and buyer grew, and the ability of
consumers to detect defects lessened, the need for a legal remedy became
more apparent. Courts in cases like McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 4I and
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors42 recognized that products other than
poisons and explosives create an "imminent danger" to consumers and
accordingly, imposed a duty upon manufacturers to ensure the safety of
all products.43
In 1963, the Supreme Court of California, in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,4 held that manufacturers are strictly liable in tort
when (1) the manufacturer places a product on the market (2) knowing
that a consumer will use the product without inspecting it for defects, and
(3) a defect in the product in fact causes injury to a consumer.45  By
1965, the American Law Institute officially adopted the rule of strict
product liability in tort, codified under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 4 6  Four years later, in Ulmer v. Ford Motor, Co.,
4 7
Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 52, 160 P. 14, 15 (1916); Mazetti, 75 Wash. at 624-25, 135 P. at
634.
38. Gates v. Standard Brands Inc., 43 Wash. App. 520, 523, 719 P.2d 130, 132 (1986).
39. See William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960).
40. See id at 1100; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
41. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
42. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
43. See Owen, supra note 15, at 965-67.
44. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
45. Id. at 900.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the us-
er or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all pos-
sible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
[Vol. 32:741
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Washington courts adopted the theory of strict liability outlined in
section 402A. The Ulmer Court abandoned the label "implied warranty,"
reasoning that it was "illogical to create an implied warranty but refuse to
attach to it any of the customary incidents of a [contractual] warranty. ' 48
Subsequently, Washington courts designated the remedy for injuries
caused by defective products in tort, no longer discussing the doctrine in
contractual terms.
As the rapid and widespread adoption of strict liability made it
easier for consumers to recover damages for product-related injuries, a
backlash developed. In 1979, the United States Department of Com-
merce introduced the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (MUPLA),49
with the intention of protecting retailers from lawsuits. 50  The authors of
the MUPLA, recognizing the potential for inconsistencies when develop-
ing product liability law on a case-by-case basis, 5' designed the MUPLA
to create a uniform and stable standard of product liability law in all fifty
states. 52 Two years later, in 1981, the Washington legislature enacted the
WPLA, adopting definitions similar to those used in the MUPLA.53
A. Manufacturer Liability under the WPLA
Following the approach prescribed in the MUPLA, the WPLA
holds manufacturers strictly liable54 for injuries resulting from products
that are (1) unreasonably safe in construction, (2) non-conforming with
the manufacturer's express warranties, or (3) non-conforming with statu-
torily implied warranties.55 The WPLA defines the three categories of
liability:
47. 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
48. Id. at 529, 452 P.2d at 733.
49. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979).
50. The MUPLA's introductory section states: "A product seller should not, through the me-
dium of tort law, be asked to pay merely because its product caused an injury." Id. at 62,715. The
introduction further states a vague concern expressed by insurance companies that, under then-
existing laws (presumably the standards expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts), plaintiffs
could potentially recover damages if they "merely proved that they were injured by a product." Id.
at 62,714.
51.Id. at 62,714.
52. Id.
53. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010 (2008), with Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,717-18.
54. In contrast, non-manufacturing sellers are held liable only for negligence unless they fall
within certain exceptions. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
55. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2) ("A product manufacturer is subject to strict liability
to a claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the fact that the product was not
reasonably safe in construction or not reasonably safe because it did not conform to the manufac-
turer's express warranty or to the implied warranties under Title 62A RCW.").
Washington Revised Code § 7.72.030(t) provides that manufacturers are liable "to a claimant
if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer in that the
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(a) A product is not reasonably safe in construction if, when the
product left the control of the manufacturer, the product deviated in
some material way from the design specifications or performance
standards of the manufacturer, or deviated in some material way
from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
(b) A product does not conform to the express warranty of the
manufacturer if it is made part of the basis of the bargain and relates
to a material fact or facts concerning the product and the express
warranty proved to be untrue.
(c) Whether or not a product conforms to an implied warrant
created under Title 62A RCW shall be determined under that title.
To hold a manufacturer strictly liable for injuries to a claimant, the
product must not only fit into one of the foregoing categories; it must
also be considered unsafe by the ordinary consumer. 57  For example,
some products, such as knives, are inherently dangerous, but such danger
is to be expected by the ordinary consumer.
B. Defining the Manufacturer Liability Terms
The key modification that the WPLA made to the common law was
limiting the strict liability standard to manufacturers, thereby exculpating
retailers from such claims.58 Applying the strict liability standard out-
lined in the WPLA requires special attention to the definitions of key
terms in Washington Revised Code § 7.72.010, including (a) "product,"
(b) "product seller," and (c) "manufacturer." 59 These terms provide a
roadmap that Washington courts follow to determine the scope and
degree of liability defendants face under the WPLA.
1. Product
The first step in establishing an entity's liability under the WPLA is
to determine whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by a "product."
The WPLA defines a product as "any object possessing intrinsic value,
product was not reasonably safe as designed or not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or
instructions were not provided." However, the unreasonable design and failure to warn cases
to which this provision applies are outside the scope of this Comment and are not discussed. All
references in this Comment to manufacturer liability apply strictly to the "not reasonably safe in
construction" and "non-conformity to express or implied warranty" provisions of section
7.72.030(2).
56. Id. § 7.72.030(2) (emphasis added). "Title 62A RCW" refers to Washington's incorpora-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). See id. § 62A.1-.101 (2008).
57. See id. § 7.72.030(3).
58. Compare id. § 7.72.030(2)(a), with Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145,
542 P.2d 774 (1975).
59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010.
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capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as a component part
or parts, and produced for introduction into trade or commerce. 6 °
Although rarely examined by Washington courts in cases of food product
liability, one Washington court has held that school lunches sold by a
school district were "products" within meaning of the WPLA.61
2. Product Seller
The second step in establishing an entity's liability under the
WPLA is to determine whether the defendant was a "product seller."
The WPLA defines a product seller as "any person or entity that is
engaged in the business of selling products, whether the sale is for resale,
or for use or consumption., 62 The term "product seller" includes manu-
facturers, wholesalers, distributors, or retailers of the relevant product-
the product or its component part or parts that gave rise to the product
liability claim.63 The term "product seller" also includes a party who is
in the business of leasing or bailing such products.64 The term, however,
specifically excludes (1) sellers of real property, (2) providers of profes-
sional services, (3) commercial sellers of used products, provided the
used product is in essentially the same condition as when it was acquired
for resale, (4) "finance lessors, 65 and (5) licensed pharmacists who
dispense prescriptions manufactured by a commercial manufacturer.66
The WPLA further enumerates instances when courts may or may
not find that a passive product seller is a manufacturer. The WPLA
states that a passive product seller is a manufacturer if (1) the seller (or
entity not otherwise a manufacturer) holds itself out as a manufacturer 61
60. Id. § 7.72.010(3).
61. See Almquist v. Finley Sch. Dist. No. 53, 114 Wash. App. 395, 403, 57 P.3d 1191, 1196
(2002).
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(l).
63. See id. § 7.72.010(3).
64. Id. § 7.72.010(l).
65. The WPLA defines a finance lessor as "one who acts in a financial capacity, who is not a
manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or retailer, and who leases a product without having a reason-
able opportunity to inspect and discover defects in the product, under a lease arrangement in which
the selection, possession, maintenance, and operation of the product are controlled by a person other
than the lessor." Id. § 7.72.010(l)(d).
66. See id. § 7.72.010(1)(a)-(e).
67. See Cadwell Indus., Inc. v. Chenbro Am., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (E.D. Wash.
2000). The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 400 states: "One who puts out as his own product
a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufac-
turer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965). Under the WPLA, an entity holds itself
out to the public as the manufacturer of a product if its advertising would lead a reasonable
purchaser to believe that the entity, rather than some other party, was the actual manufacturer. See
Cadwell, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. This can be accomplished by, for example, an entity putting its
own name on a product that it did not otherwise manufacture. See id. at 1115.
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or (2) the seller acts as a wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of a product
only to the extent that it designs, produces, makes, fabricates, constructs,
or remanufactures the product for its sale.68
The WPLA states that a passive product seller is not a manufacturer
if (1) the seller only performs minor assembly of a product in accordance
with the instructions of the manufacturer, or (2) the seller did not partici-
pate in the design of a product and constructed the product in accordance
with the design specifications of the claimant or another product seller.69
With this last distinction, the WPLA distinguishes between product
sellers who have some control over production and those who act as
"mere conduits" in the chain of distribution.7 ° The purpose of this provi-
sion is to exclude non-manufacturing retailers from strict liability
claims.
71
3. Manufacturer
The final step in establishing liability under the WPLA is to
determine whether the defendant was the manufacturer of the relevant
product. The WPLA defines a product manufacturer as "a product seller
who designs, produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures
the relevant product or component part of a product before its sale to a
user or consumer."
72
By utilizing these three terms, Washington courts distinguish those
least culpable in the supply chain (passive retailers) from those most
culpable (manufacturing product sellers). This, in turn, assigns liability
thresholds, limiting passive product sellers to a negligence standard
while holding manufacturers strictly liable for harm caused by defective
products. Washington courts, however, have applied these definitions
73inconsistently, especially in foodborne illness cases.
IV. A STUDY IN CONTRADICTORY RESULTS: APPLICATIONS OF THE
WASHINGTON PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT IN FOODBORNE ILLNESS CASES
Foodborne illness cases often do not present circumstances that fall
under the traditional means of assessing manufacturer liability. In these
cases, courts find one question perennially important: What constitutes a
68. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.0 10 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Butello v. S.A. Woods-Yates Am. Mach. Co., 72 Wash. App. 397, 404, 864 P.2d 948, 952
(1993).
71. Id.
72. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010 (also defining "product seller" by exclusion, "manufac-
turer," "product," "relevant product," "product liability claim," "claimant," and "harm").
73. See discussion infra Part IV.
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material change to a food product that creates manufacturer liability?
For example, which steps in the production of one food product-
ready-to-eat lettuce--constitute manufacturing? Does a lettuce farmer
manufacture a product when the farmer plants the lettuce and harvests it?
Does a lettuce distributor manufacture a product when it washes and
packages the lettuce for distribution to restaurants? Does a restaurant
manufacture a product when the restaurant slices the lettuce, adds
croutons and dressing, and sells the product as a salad to consumers?
Washington courts have utilized varying approaches to answer
these questions, resulting in an unclear standard of liability and unpre-
dictable results in any given case. The following two cases illustrate the
unpredictability of the current test to assess manufacturer liability.
A. Almquist v. Finley School Dist. No. 53
In 2002, a group of parents in Kennewick, Washington, filed suit
against the Finley School District to recover damages for injuries
incurred by eleven children who became infected with E. coli 0157:H7
bacteria in October 1998.74 Ten of the children attended Finley Elemen-
tary; the eleventh child was a two-year old playmate of two of the
infected students. 75 An investigation, headed by the Washington State
Department of Health, concluded that the infected school children
engaged in no common school activity other than eating at the school
cafeteria.76 The investigative team concluded that the most probable
source of the E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria was ground beef served in Finley
school cafeteria tacos.
77
The parents of the ill children sued the Finely School District and
Northern States Beef,78 alleging that both defendants were manufacturers
of a product (taco filling) that was not reasonably safe. 79 Northern States
Beef was dismissed from the suit after settling out of court.80 The plain-
tiffs then moved for summary judgment against the District on the issue
of liability. 8' Addressing the plaintiffs' motion, the trial court ruled, first,
that the taco filling, as opposed to the frozen meat, was a defective
74. Almquist v. Finley Sch. Dist. No. 53, 114 Wash. App. 395, 399, 57 P.3d 1191, 1194
(2002).
75. Id. at 399, 57 P.3d at 1193.
76. Id. at 399, 57 P.3d at 1193-94.
77. Id. at 399, 57 P.3d at 1194.
78. Northern States Beef supplied the meat used by the Finley School District. See Jury
Awards $4.75 Million to Washington State Students Sickened by E. coli in School Lunch, Bus. WIRE,
Feb. 20, 2001, available at http://findarticles.con/p/articles/mi-mOEIN/is_2001_Feb 20/ai_
70702016.
79. Almquist, 114 Wash. App. at 399, 57 P.3d at 1194.
80. Id. at 400, 57 P.3d at 1194.
81. Id.
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"product" for purposes of the WPLA and, second, that the District's
processing of frozen ground beef into cooked taco filling created manu-
facturer liability under the WPLA.82 As a result, the District could be
strictly liable for the injuries resulting from the taco filling if the jury
concluded that the taco meals caused the E. coli outbreak.83 After a
three-week trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs: the taco meals
contained E. coli 0157:H7; the meals were the cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries;14 and the District was 100% at fault.85
On appeal, the District argued, inter alia, that it was not a "manu-
facturer" as defined by the WPLA.86 According to the District, the
determination of whether a defendant is a manufacturer was a question of
fact for the jury and, therefore, should not have been resolved by the trial
court on summary judgment.87 The Washington Court of Appeals was
not convinced, noting that the material facts regarding manufacturer
liability were undisputed. Because the District conceded that it had
stored, thawed, cooked, drained, rinsed, seasoned, and mixed the frozen
ground beef, the court reasoned that the consequences of these
activities-that is, whether the District's activities constituted manufac-
turing--could be decided as a matter of law.88
The court then reviewed the trial court's decision that the District
was a manufacturer. To determine whether the District's activities
amounted to manufacturing, the appellate court turned to the definition
of "manufacturer" under the WPLA: "[The term] 'manufacturer'
includes a product seller who designs, produces, makes, fabricates, con-
structs, or remanufactures the relevant product or component part of a
product before its sale to a user or consumer., 89  Because the WPLA
provides no definition for these terms, 90 the court assigned dictionary
82. Id.
83.Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The jury found that Northern States Beef was not at fault. Id. For purposes of appor-
tioning fault in product liability cases in Washington, the jury considers the actions of all defendant-
manufacturers, even if (as was the case with Northern States Beef) a defendant has settled out of
court.
86. See id. at 401, 57 P.3d at 1195. The District specifically argued that, as a "professional
provider of education services," it fell within the "professional services" exception to the product
seller clause. Id. at 401, 57 P.3d at 1195 (referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(I)(b) (2000)).
In response, the appellate court noted that the trial court had already rejected the District's conten-
tion that it was a mere "product seller." Id.
87. Id. at 404, 57 P.3d at 1196.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 404-05, 57 P.3d at 1196 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2) (2000)).
90. See discussion supra Part III.B. The specific WPLA terms that describe manufacturing
duties are "designs, produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures." See WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.72.010(2).
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definitions to the terms "design," "produce," "make," "fabricate," and
"construct."9' After applying these definitions to the District's conceded
actions, the court of appeals reached the same conclusion as the trial
court: the District was liable as a manufacturer of tacos.92
The analysis undertaken by both the trial court and the court of
appeals in Almquist provides insight into what this Comment calls the
"physical alteration" approach to determining manufacturer liability.
The physical alteration approach focuses on whether a seller has physi-
cally changed the product enough to make the seller a manufacturer. In
Almquist, both the trial court and the court of appeals relied on three key
elements to hold that the defendant was a manufacturer: (1) the defen-
dant's admission of activities undertaken involving the "product" in
controversy; (2) dictionary definitions of the terms used to describe
manufacturing activities in the WPLA; and (3) the court's subjective
interpretation whether the defendant's admitted activities constituted a
sufficient physical alteration to the product to comport with the
dictionary definitions of the WPLA terms.
Although the appellate court's use of the physical alteration
approach in Almquist subjected the defendant to manufacturer liability,
the same approach can yield a drastically different outcome if a court
subjectively concludes that an entity has not sufficiently altered the phys-
ical appearance of a product, despite engaging in similar production
processes to the processes in Almquist. One such differing outcome
came just one year later in Hadley v. Spokane Produce, Inc.93
B. Hadley v. Spokane Produce, Inc.
In 2003, a group of families and individuals from northeastern
Washington and north Idaho filed suit against Spokane Produce, a
romaine lettuce distributor, alleging that Spokane Produce was liable for
injuries resulting from a 2002 E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak.94 A report
issued by the Spokane Regional Health District indicated a strong asso-
ciation between a salad offered at an Eastern Washington University
dance camp and culture-confirmed gastroenteritis. 95 E. coli 0157:H7
91. A lmquist, 114 Wash. App. at 405, 57 P.3 d at 1196-97; see also infra note 144.
92. Almquist, 114 Wash. App. at 405-06, 57 P.3d at 1197.
93. No. 03-2-01520-7 (Spokane County Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (on file with author).
94. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Nationwide Alert to Consumers
About Spokane Produce Brand Romaine Lettuce Due to Possible Health Risk (July 29, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2002/NEW00824.html.
95. See Marler Clark, Spokane Produce E. Coli Outbreak, http://www.marlerclark.com/
produce-outbreaks/spokane.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). Regarding gastroenteritis, the Merck
Manual states:
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infections were also reported by consumers of salads purchased from a
small number of Spokane and Walla Walla restaurants.96 The source of
the lettuce used in the salads from both the dance camp and the outlying
restaurants was eventually traced to Spokane Produce.97
The plaintiffs claimed that, under the WPLA, Spokane Produce was
strictly liable as the "manufacturer" of a product (ready-to-eat lettuce)
that was not reasonably safe.98 On September 13, 2004, Spokane Pro-
duce filed for summary judgment, asking the trial court to dismiss
all claims against the company. 99 After hearing oral arguments on the
motion and allowing supplemental briefing from the plaintiffs regarding
an additional claim of "holding-out" liability,'00 the court granted
Spokane Produce's summary judgment motion.' 0'
Significantly, when rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments, the Hadley
court used the physical alteration standard, following steps virtually
identical to those used in Almquist; however, the court reached an
opposite result. Like the defendant in Almquist,10 2 the defendant in
Hadley admitted to engaging in a certain set of activities: acquiring raw
lettuce, rinsing it, cutting it, packaging it, and selling it.,0 3  Like the
Almquist court, the Hadley court recognized that the packaged lettuce
was a product, stating that "the facts in this particular case are that [Spo-
kane Produce was not] a manufacturer of that product. °10 4  But,
unlike the Almquist court, the Hadley court ruled that Spokane Produce's
admitted activities did not constitute designing, producing, making,
fabricating, constructing, or remanufacturing the relevant product-the
packaged romaine lettuce. In contrast with the reasoning of the Almquist
court, the Hadley court reasoned: "What Spokane Produce did is they got
material, the lettuce, they rinsed it, they cut it up, and put it in a bag and
Gastroenteritis is inflammation of the lining of the stomach and small and large intes-
tines. Most cases are infectious, although gastroenteritis may follow ingestion of drugs
and chemical toxins (e.g., metals, plant substances). Symptoms include anorexia, nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal discomfort. Diagnosis is clinical or by stool culture,
although immunoassays are increasingly used.
Merck Manuals Online Medical Library, Gastroenteritis, http://www.merck.com/mmpe/sec02/
chO I 6/chO 1 6a.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
96. Marler Clark, supra note 95, at 2.
97. Id.
98. See Brief in Support of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at 2-3, Hadley, No. 03-
2-01520-7 (on file with author).
99.Id. at4.
100. See discussion supra note 67.
101. Brief in Support of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 98, at 5-6.
102. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
103. See Transcript of Oral Ruling at 5, Hadley, No. 03-2-01520-7 (on file with author).
104. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
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sold it. The lettuce was still lettuce when it went out, and it was the same
lettuce except cleaned and cut that came in."' 0
5
C. An Unworkable Test
Synthesizing the summary judgment rulings in Hadley and
Almquist reveals that Washington courts have been applying an unwork-
able test to determine manufacturer liability in foodborne illness cases.
Under the reasoning of these cases, a seller of a food product is a manu-
facturer when the seller stores, thaws, cooks, drains, rinses, and seasons
the product. But the seller is not a manufacturer when the seller receives,
washes, cuts up, packages, and sells the food product.
The inconsistency between the two rulings illustrates the primary
pitfall of the physical alteration approach. By generating a list of activi-
ties promulgated by a defendant and contrasting those activities with the
WPLA "manufacturing" terms, 10 6 Washington courts have created a
test that premises manufacturer liability on semantics rather than on
whether an entity created the relevant product that caused the injury.
Unpredictable and inconsistent trial outcomes are the result of this
unclear standard: the Almquist case went to trial because the school
district did not believe it was a manufacturer, while in Hadley, the plain-
tiffs were shocked to find a court ruling that Spokane Produce was not a
manufacturer. In both cases, the court's differing summary judgment
rulings stymied the attempts of the parties to reasonably predict a likely
outcome.
This result is contrary to the original MUPLA statutory goals of
creating a stable standard of product liability law and avoiding case-by-
case changes to the law. 10 7 To prevent unpredictable trial outcomes,
Washington courts must apply an objective, bright-line test to determine
manufacturer liability under the WPLA.
V. THE VALUE-ADDED STANDARD:
LOOKING TO THE PAST TO CREATE A WORKABLE TEST
By failing to consider the value that a seller adds to a product,
Washington courts have created an arbitrary, malleable dividing line
between who is and who is not a manufacturer under the WPLA. As
illustrated in both Almquist and Hadley, Washington courts have looked
solely to the physical appearance of a product to discern a measurable
and tangible change onto which the courts can anchor terms like
105. Id. at 5.
106. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2) (2008).
107. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,718-19 (Oct. 31, 1979).
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"designs, produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures."'
10 8
Under the rulings in both cases, if the product's appearance does not
match the court's interpretation of those listed terms, an entity will not be
deemed a manufacturer. 10 9 By not considering the apparent economic
changes a seller makes to a product, a seven-step taco meat production
process may constitute manufacturing, whereas a five-step lettuce
production process may not. A succinct statement by the Hadley court
illustrates how oversimplified a legal analysis can become when the
court relies on physical appearance to decide an issue of law: "The
lettuce was still lettuce when it went out."' 10
An approach that turns solely on physical changes to a product is
problematic because the WPLA applies to a wide variety of products-
ranging from food products to children's toys to industrial pipe systems.
For any given consumer good, multiple entities may alter and refine the
product before it enters its relevant market. Whereas one entity, such as
an automobile maker, may engage in a production process in which
physical alterations to a product are readily apparent, another entity, such
as a romaine lettuce distributor, may add a proportional amount of value
to a product while making few if any physical alterations.
In Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co.,' 1 the Washington Supreme
Court avoided the inconsistencies of the physical alteration approach by
focusing on the relevant product the plaintiff purchased: a pipeline
system.' 2 Putting the product in its relevant context allowed the Court
to determine whether the defendant had contracted to manufacture that
specific, relevant product. 13 This "relevant product" analysis suggests
that the wording of the WPLA already contains a value-added concept of
manufacturing that will help courts produce the predictable outcomes
that were sorely lacking in Almquist and Hadley.
A. Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co.
In October 1986, plaintiff Norman Washburn and a fellow Boeing
company employee were attempting to test a standby propane fuel heat-
ing system that had been in Boeing's facility in Kent, Washington, since
1969.1 4 Upon activating the system, the plaintiff noted that there was no
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2).
109. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
110. Transcript of Oral Ruling, supra note 103, at 5.
111. 120 Wash. 2d 246, 840 P.2d 860 (1992).
112. See id. at 259, 840 P.2d at 868.
113. See id. ("Defendant was not merely selling pieces of pipe, it was to make, fabricate and
construct a pipeline system.").
114. Id. at 252, 840 P.2d at 864.
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gas pressure showing on the system's pressure gauge." 5 Moments later,
the system exploded. 1 6 The building caught fire.1 17 The automobiles
parked in a nearby parking lot caught fire."I8 Both the plaintiff and his
co-worker caught fire." 19 Within ten hours, the co-worker was dead, and
the plaintiff had burns on over 70% of his body.120
Seventeen years before the explosion, the defendant, Beatt Equip-
ment Company, had been subcontracted to construct the propane fuel
heating system, including supplying the piping material, performing
various finishing processes on the piping, and burying the finished
pipeline. 121  Substantial evidence introduced at trial indicated that the
defendant had failed to comply with either the contractual specifications
or industry standards during installation. 22 Specifically, the piping was
not properly prepared; the defendant failed to apply a special coal tar
enamel coating and instead opted for a cheaper and less durable asphalt
coating. 23  Because of this improper coating, the piping system
corroded, leading to its eventual failure and the resulting catastrophe. 124
The jury found the Beatt Equipment Company liable for $8 million
in damages for the plaintiff's injuries.125 After the trial judge reduced the
damages to $5.67 million, both the plaintiff and defendant appealed to
the Washington Supreme Court.
126
On appeal, the defendant argued that a statute of repose 127 barred
the plaintiffs action. 28 Rejecting the defendant's argument, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court noted that the state's statute of repose did not
protect product manufacturers. 29  Additionally, because the defendant
had offered the jury instruction defining "manufacturer" and had not
objected to a jury instruction defining when a product is unreasonably
115. id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118.Id
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 252-53, 840 P.2d at 864.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 253, 840 P.2d at 864-65.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 251, 840 P.2d at 864. The jury awarded $6 million to the plaintiff and $2
million to the plaintiffs wife. Id.
126. Id.
127. A statute of repose is a "statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since
the defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends
before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
128. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 251, 840 P.2d at 864.
129. Id. at 254, 840 P.2d at 865 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300 (1988)). The Washing-
ton legislature added the provision that the statute "shall not apply to claims or causes of action
against manufacturers" in 1986 but deleted it in 2004. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300 (2008).
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safe, the defendant was bound by its own proposed definition of
manufacturer on appeal.
130
It is important to note that the defendant's "manufacturer" defini-
tion in Washburn is identical to the definition of "manufacturer" in the
WPLA.' 3 ' Thus, although Washburn is only persuasive authority in
WPLA cases, the Washington Supreme Court's analysis of what consti-
tutes a "manufacturer" provides a useful framework for resolving the
inconsistencies associated with the "physical alteration" test.
The Washburn Court began by noting that the defendant's
"manufacturer" definition, like the WPLA definition, did not require that
the product be mass-produced. 132  Under both definitions, making,
producing, fabricating, or constructing "a single product or even a single
component part of a single product" can render a defendant a
manufacturer. 133 The court then identified the key terms that define the
term "manufacturer": a manufacturer (1) produces, (2) makes, (3) fabri-
cates, (4) constructs, or (5) remanufactures the relevant product. 134 After
identifying these terms, the court referenced the dictionary to provide
their definitions, 135 just as lower courts had done when using the physical
alteration approach.
136
130. See Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 251, 840 P.2d at 864.
131. Id. at 256, 840 P.2d at 867. The defendant's jury instruction provided:
A product seller is any person or entity that is engaged in the business of selling
products, whether the sale is for resale, or for use and consumption. The term includes a
manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer of the relevant product.
Manufacturer includes a product seller who designs, produces, makes, fabricates,
constructs or remanufactures the relevant product or component part of a product before
its sale to a user or consumer.
A product seller who performs minor assembly of a product in accordance with
manufacturer's instructions shall not be deemed a manufacturer.
Id. at 255 n.4, 840 P.2d at 866. Section 7.72.010 similarly provides, in relevant part:
"Product seller" means any person or entity that is engaged in the business of selling
products, whether the sale is for resale, or for use or consumption. The term includes a
manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of the relevant product.
"Manufacturer" includes a product seller who designs, produces, makes, fabricates,
constructs, or remanufactures the relevant product or component part of a product before
its sale to a user or consumer....
A product seller who performs minor assembly of a product in accordance with the
instructions of the manufacturer shall not be deemed a manufacturer.
WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.72.010(1)-(2) (2008).
132. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 259, 840 P.2d at 868.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2).
135. See Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 259, 840 P.2d at 868. The Washburn court defined these
terms as follows:
"Produce" includes "to give being, form, or shape to" and "to make economically valu-
able". (Italics ours.) WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1810
(1981). To "make" includes "to bring (a material thing) into being by forming, shaping,
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The court's next analytical step, however, was the crucial part of
the manufacturer analysis overlooked by the Almquist and Hadley courts.
Rather than considering the product (pipes) in the abstract, the court
considered the product that the consumer purchased-the "relevant prod-
uct.' 37 The court explained: "The prime contract for which defendant
was a subcontractor was not for individual parts, but. for a system.
Defendant was paid a lump sum. Defendant was not merely selling
pieces of pipe, it was to make, fabricate and construct a pipeline
system.' 38
Having established the relevant product as a baseline, the Washburn
Court applied the defined terms from the defendant's proposed jury
instruction to determine the steps the defendant had taken to add
economic value to the specific product that the Boeing Company had
purchased: 1
39
Defendant took an unfinished and unusable product, and by use of
its labor and materials made it economically valuable. That is one
of the definitions of "produce". Defendant altered the unfinished
material and put together components to make a finished product.
That is one of the definitions of "make". Defendant formed a whole
by uniting parts. That is a definition of 'fabricate". Defendant put
together constituent parts, after completing their manufacture, so as
to make or create something, i.e., a usable pipeline system. That is
a definition of "construct". 
140
Thus, under its own definition and the definition of the WPLA, Beatt
Equipment Company was a manufacturer141
or altering material"; "to lay out and construct", and "to put together from components
or ingredients". (Italics ours.) [Id.] at 1363. To "fabricate" means "to form into a whole
by uniting parts" and "to build up into a whole by uniting interchangeable standardized
parts". (Italics ours.) [Id.] at 811. To "construct" includes "to form, make, or create by
combining parts or elements". [id.] at 489.
Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 259, 840 P.2d at 868.
136. For example, the court of appeals in Almquist similarly defined the same terms:
To "produce" means "to give being, form, or shape to: make often from raw materials."
[WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY] 1818 [(1993)]. "Make" includes
"to bring (a material thing) into being by forming, shaping, or altering material." [1d.] at
1363. "Fabricate" includes "to form into a whole by uniting parts." [Id.] at 811. "Con-
struct" includes "to form, make, or create by combining parts or elements." [id.] at 489.
Almquist v. Finley Sch. Dist. No. 53, 114 Wash. App. 395, 405, 57 P.3d 1191, 1196-97 (2002).
137. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2).
138. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 259, 840 P.2d at 868.
139. See id. at 259-61, 840 P.2d at 868-69.
140. Id. at 261, 840 P.2d at 869.
141. Id.
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B. A Workable Test
The Almquist, Hadley, and Washburn courts have each applied the
manufacturer definition from the WPLA with varying results.142 Under
the WPLA, "[a manufacturer] includes a product seller who designs,
produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the relevant
product or component part of a product before its sale to a user or
consumer. 14  The Almquist, Hadley, and Washburn courts all referred to
these terms; all defined them using the same source; and all used the
terms as the guideline to assess whether the defendant was liable as a
manufacturer. Nonetheless, the cases produced differing results on an
issue of law that should have been predictable. Without a unified
approach to applying the terms of the WPLA, future outcomes in cases
like these will remain unpredictable. The need for a unified approach is
not to resolve ambiguities inherent in the statue itself but to address the
problems the courts have had with interpreting the WPLA.
Of the Almquist, Hadley, and Washburn courts, only the Washburn
Court applied the crucial "relevant product" language from the WPLA.1
44
Determining the relevant product that the consumer purchased allows a
court to examine which entity in the chain of manufacturing has caused
the product's dangerous aspect. For example, in Washburn, Beatt
Equipment Company was not paid merely to assemble some pipes; it was
paid to produce the product that Boeing desired: a pipeline for a heating
system.14 5 And it was Beatt Equipment Company's failure to apply the
special enamel coating that caused the pipeline in the heating system to
corrode, 146 not the entity that had produced the metal or the entity that
had welded metal into pipes. Determining when the defect occurred in
the chain of manufacturing is critical to apportioning liability among
manufacturers. Apportioning liability is especially important because in
any given product liability lawsuit, there can be multiple manufactur-
ers. 1
47
Even more importantly, by focusing on the relevant product instead
of on the product's physical alteration, courts do not become distracted
142. Even though the Washburn court actually analyzed the defendant's proposed jury instruc-
tion, this Comment will hereafter refer to the court's analysis as if it had directly analyzed the
WPLA. As the court noted, the text of the two definitions is nearly identical. See id at 256, 840
P.2d at 867 ("[T]he definition of manufacturer in instruction 17 is identical to the definition in the
product liability act, RCW 7.72.010(2)."); see also supra note 131.
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
144. See id. § 7.72.010(3).
145. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 259, 840 P.2d at 868.
146. Id. at 253, 840 P.2d at 864-65.
147. For example, in Alm quist, both the school district and the meat company were deemed
manufacturers for liability purposes. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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by the question of how much alteration is enough to constitute manufac-
turing-under the Supreme Court's value analysis in Washburn, any
alteration to the relevant product is enough.
As the diametrically opposed results of Alm quist and Hadley show,
the physical alteration approach currently employed by Washington
courts erroneously emphasizes the manufacturing process over the
end-product that the consumer purchases. The ramification of this
approach is inconsistent trial outcomes. At best, these outcomes result in
excessive monetary expenditures, and, at worst, they render the service
of justice a virtual impossibility. Courts should instead consolidate the
methods used by the Almquist, Hadley, and Washburn courts and apply
the unified approach that this Comment calls the value-added test.
VI. CONSOLIDATING THE COMPONENTS TO CREATE
THE "VALUE-ADDED" TEST
The value-added test for manufacturer liability consists of a three-
step analysis. First, the court identifies the relevant product for the
purpose of a consumer's claim against a given entity. Second, the court
determines whether the entity was at least a "mere conduit" and thus a
seller of the product. Finally, if the entity is at least a product seller, the
court determines what economic value the entity added to the relevant
product and determines whether the steps the entity undertook to add
economic value amounted to designing, producing, making, fabricating,
constructing, or remanufacturing the relevant product.
An illustration of how courts would apply the value-added test
shows how the approach will make trial outcomes more predictable. For
example, if the Hadley court had applied the value-added test, the court
would have first determined the relevant product that gave rise to the
consumer's claim. In Hadley, the relevant product was ready-to-eat
lettuce. The court would have next determined whether the defendant,
Spokane Produce, was at least a conduit for the product and thus a seller.
Spokane Product did indeed sell the product (ready-to-eat lettuce) to a
willing purchaser, and thus, it was a product seller under the WPLA 1 48
Finally, the court would have determined the economic value Spokane
Produce added to the ready-to-eat lettuce and whether the steps it took to
add that value amounted to designing, producing, making, fabricating,
constructing, or remanufacturing the ready-to-eat product. In Hadley,
Spokane Produce took a raw head of lettuce and added value to it by
transforming it into ready-to-eat lettuce-the relevant product that the
148. As discussed in Part III.B.2, a "product seller" must merely be engaged in the "business of
selling products." Whether the product seller sells the product to a retailer or the end consumer is
irrelevant for purposes of the WPLA. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(1).
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consumer purchased and the product that gave rise to the product liability
claim. To add value to the raw head of lettuce, Spokane Produce
"designed" a ready-to-eat product; they "produced" and "made" the rele-
vant product by cutting up and washing the raw head of lettuce. They
also "fabricated" and "constructed" the relevant product by packaging
the washed and cut lettuce as the ready-to-eat final product. Under this
analysis, Spokane Produce would have clearly faced manufacturer
liability.
The importance of starting with the relevant product baseline is
rooted in the foundations of modem product liability law. 149 During the
industrialization of America, product liability law developed as the link
between a consumer and a product producer became more attenuated. 50
Any given product must pass through a number of hands in the produc-
tion and distribution chain before it reaches the end consumer. Therein
lies the importance of the term "relevant product": the term works as a
check to differentiate between various levels of production.
As defined in the WPLA, the "relevant product" is "that product or
its component part or parts, which gave rise to the product liability
claim." 5' At any level of the production chain, different products are
exchanged. For example, in Washburn, the Court recognized that,
although the defendant had purchased metal piping, the relevant product
the defendant sold to Boeing was an underground system of piping; the
defendant added economic value to the piping by applying special
coatings and welding the pipes in to a single unit, transforming it into a
product.
Similarly, in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 52 the court implicitly
recognized, nearly 100 years ago, that a consumer relies on the safety
of the relevant product when he or she purchases it.' 53 In Mazetti, the
relevant product was canned meat, "prepared and ready to be used for
food without further cooking or labor"' 54-not a cow, not a carcass, not a
slab of raw beef, nor any of the other incarnations of the product along
the production chain. Like the court in Washburn,'55 the Mazetti Court
recognized that the consumer had no use for the product in the produc-
tion chain, which would eventually result in the canned meat: the cow,
the carcass, or the slab of raw beef.5 6 Rather, the consumer was inter-
149. See discussion supra Part 11.
150. See discussion supra Part II.
151. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(3).
152.75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
153. See id. at 624, 135 P. at 634.
154. See id. at 623, 135 P. at 633.
155. See discussion supra Part V.A.
156. See Mazetti, 75 Wash. at 629, 135 P. at 636.
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ested only in the canning process that transformed the raw product into
the relevant product, that which was "prepared and ready to be used for
food without further cooking or labor." 157 The Washington Supreme
Court, thus, emphasized the importance of the injured consumer in
determining what the relevant product was and the "location" of the
defect that caused injury.
The WPLA did not abandon this consumer-oriented approach.1
58
The relevant product language exists, as the MUPLA stated, to delineate
the product that actually gave rise to the product liability claim-the
product the consumer purchased. 59 Courts, however, have effectively
disregarded the purpose a product serves to the consumer by analyzing
the statute solely in terms of what physical alterations entities make.
Instead, after determining whether the seller passed the threshold of at
least acting as more than a passive conduit for the product, courts should
look to the economic value the seller added to the product.
If a consumer purchases a bag of lettuce with the expectation that it
was washed and ready to consume, then the company that rinsed, cut up,
and bagged the lettuce created a product with different economic value
than the product had as a mere raw head of lettuce. After all, the
company that rinsed, cut up, and bagged the lettuce based their entire
business model on adding value to raw lettuce to sell it to consumers at a
premium. By analyzing this product under the physical alteration frame-
work, however, courts have reached an unsound conclusion to the
detriment of the consumer: the "lettuce was still lettuce when it went
out.'
160
The value-added test is constructed with the goal of consistent trial
outcomes, unlike those in Almquist and Hadley. This test narrows the
scope of the court's discretion to objective considerations of the relevant
product and the change in its economic value, thus making it more of a
bright-line test than the subjective physical alteration approach. Because
the value-added test is a bright-line test, it is unlikely to achieve
inconsistent results.
VII. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS TO
THE "VALUE-ADDED" APPROACH
Although the courts' application of the value-added test would
likely bring a needed bright-line standard to manufacturer liability under
the WPLA, counterarguments to the test merit discussion and resolution.
157. Id. at 623, 135 P. at 633.
158. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2) (2008).
159. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,719 (Oct. 31, 1979).
160. Transcript of Oral Ruling, supra note 103, at 5.
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This Part addresses these counterarguments by first examining
overbreadth concerns and then addressing underbreadth concerns.
A. Overbreadth Concerns
At first glance, a "value-added" approach to determining manufac-
turer liability could seem overly inclusive. After all, one might ask, do
not all entities in the production chain of a product add at least some
value to the product? This assumption makes intuitive sense given that,
at each level of the production chain, a product is normally in some way
altered and sold to the next producer for a marked-up price. The
WPLA's existing guidelines, however, ameliorate this and most
other potential pitfalls associated with a value-added approach. These
guidelines narrow the application of manufacturer liability to only enti-
ties that, through their own efforts and design, add economic value to a
product.
1. Minor Assembly Provision
Some retailers receive boxed products that they in turn assemble
according to instructions provided by the manufacturer. Under the
value-added test, it would seem that these retailers are "constructing" the
relevant product and adding economic value to it by providing the
assembly labor. The WPLA, however, provides an exception to manu-
facturer liability for a product seller that "performs minor assembly of a
product in accordance with the instructions of the manufacturer."' 161 For
example, if a retail store receives finished bicycle parts from a manufac-
turer as well as instructions from the manufacturer indicating steps store
employees must follow to assemble the finished parts into a bicycle, the
retail store will not be deemed a manufacturer under the WPLA.
Although an entity that assembles a product according to manufacturer
instructions may have added some value to that product, the WPLA rec-
ognizes that such an entity was merely a passive actor in a production
scheme controlled by the original manufacturer that both fabricated the
parts and authored the instructions.
The "minor assembly" exception necessarily depends upon product
parts that are accompanied by instructions from the manufacturer. This
distinction is crucial to manufacturer liability in food litigation, particu-
larly in cases relating to restaurant services. A restaurant that receives
food products from a distributor but assembles those food products with-
out explicit instructions from the manufacturer will not be exempted
from manufacturer liability under the "minor assembly" exception.
161. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2).
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Policy-wise, this exception comports with the original MUPLA goal of
placing "the incentive for loss prevention on the party or parties who are
best able to accomplish that goal."' 6 2 Liability is placed strictly upon the
shoulders of the manufacturer who designed the product and designed
the assembly process detailed in the instructions.
2. Suppliers of Professional Services
Certain types of entities, such as construction firms, add value to
products by engaging in building or modifying services. Under the
value-added test, a consumer might argue that the construction firm
transformed raw materials into a building, thus creating something with a
value greater than the sum of its parts. For example, the defendant
in Washburn, warned that, by utilizing a value-added approach to
manufacturer liability, the court would subject every subcontractor to
manufacturer liability, whether the subcontractor was a carpenter,
electrician, or gas pipeline layer. 163 The Court rejected the defendant's
argument for multiple reasons, the most significant of which was that,
under the defendant's manufacturer definition, 164 the defendant was
required to be a product seller in order to be subjected to manufacturer
liability. 65 As stated by the court, "[an] electrician does not produce,
make, fabricate, or construct any of the parts. 166
The WPLA explicitly states that the term "product seller" does not
include providers of professional services who utilize or sell products
within the legally authorized scope of the professional practice of the
provider.167 The distinction drawn by both the Washburn court and the
WPLA illustrates the difference between a product seller and a seller of
services. The drafters of the MUPLA, the act upon which the WPLA
was based, detailed the distinction between suppliers of professional
services and product sellers. 168 As stated in the MUPLA, under existing
common law doctrine in "the absence of any product preparation or mod-
ification, of any representation by service providers that the products are
their own, or of warranty, the courts have generally not applied product
162. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,715.
163. Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 262, 840 P.2d 860 (1992).
164. The wording used in the defendant's definition was identical to the wording used in the
Washington statute, which also requires that a manufacturer under that definition be a product seller.
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(2) (2008).
165. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 262, 840 P.2d at 869.
166. Id.
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010(l)(b) (2008).
168. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,718 (Oct. 31, 1979).
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liability doctrines where the provider is called upon to exercise such
professional judgment." 169
Given the clear exception for providers of professional services
established by the WPLA and Washington common law, confusion
over the value-added test's application to these entities is not a likely
possibility.
B. Underbreadth Concerns
Another potential criticism of the "value-added" approach is that it
will not reach all the parties that should be held liable when a product is
defective. Judicial doctrine, however, already addresses this concern.
1. Branding Issue
In some circumstances, most commonly in those involving large
retailers, a product may be manufactured and distributed by one entity
but labeled with the retailer's brand or logo. In such a case, the retailer
has not actively participated in the manufacturing process; however, the
retailer has added some value to a generic product through its branding.
Courts have long recognized that consumers may rely on package
branding to assume that the company portrayed on the packaging is the
same company that manufactured the product. 170 In recognition of this
general principle, defendants represented on the packaging of a product
may be liable under a "holding out" theory of liability, even if the defen-
dant was not actively involved in the manufacturing process. Although
the value imputed on a product by a company's logo or branding does
not subject a company to manufacturer liability, the "holding out" liabil-
ity created by such branding is at least an implicit recognition of the
value an entity adds to a product by attaching its own logo.17'
2. Comparative Fault
As recognized in Almquist, more than one manufacturer can exist in
any given case.1 72  Such a scenario was possible under the physical
alteration approach and would remain possible under the value-added
test. Given that manufacturers under the WPLA are subject to a strict
169. Id.
170. See Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 630, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913).
171. In this case, "value" may not necessarily relate to monetary value, so much as to the eco-
nomic concept of "goodwill" that a consumer seeks when the consumer relies on the assumption that
the company printed on the packaging of a product is the same company that manufactured the
product.
172. See Almquist v. Finley Sch. Dist. No. 53, 114 Wash. App. 395, 399, 57 P.3d 1191, 1194
(2002).
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liability standard, the concept that multiple parties could be held to 100%
liability for injuries caused by a defective product may seem counterin-
tuitive. Because Washington is a comparative fault state,173 however,
concerns associated with holding one manufacturer completely liable for
a relatively small contribution in the chain of manufacture are alleviated.
Instead, fault is apportioned according to each defendant manufacturer's
relative contribution. If a party settles before trial, as was the case with
Northern States Beef in Almquist, the former defendant is still repre-
sented by an "empty chair" at trial. For purposes of a final judgment, the
jury still apportions fault among all former and present defendants.
Accordingly, even with multiple manufacturers in a single case, liability
will shift to the entity for which harm from a defective product was most
foreseeable, holding those entities with the greatest ability to prevent the
harm accountable.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE OUTCOME OF A VALUE-ADDED APPROACH
Liability for food manufacturers in Washington began with a
simple premise: "A company which advertises itself as a manufacturer
and seller of pure articles of food must be deemed to have knowledge of
the contents of the articles offered for sale."' 74 Throughout the twentieth
century and into the twenty-first century, the central theme of holding
manufacturers of food products strictly liable for harm caused by
defective goods has not changed. What has wavered, however, is the
means by which Washington courts determine whether an entity is a
manufacturer. By focusing solely on the physical changes a given entity
makes to a product, the courts have created an inconsistent standard
resulting in unpredictable trial outcomes.
The value-added test creates a bright-line standard to alleviate the
woes associated with Washington's inconsistent manufacturer analysis.
The solution to the inconsistencies, however, has existed within the
framework of the WPLA since its inception. At the heart of this solution
are the two words contained within the manufacturer definition:
"relevant product." By beginning the manufacturer analysis with a
173. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (2008).
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or
harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes propor-
tionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the
claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not
under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded
under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
Id.
174. Mazetti, 75 Wash. at 626, 135 P. 634 (quoting Neiman v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co.,
127 N.W. 394, 394 (Minn. 1910)).
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determination of the product that gave rise to the liability claim, the
court's focus begins squarely with the consumer. The consumer is the
correct starting point because each manufacturer creates a product that is
more than simply the sum of its parts; the manufacturer creates a specific
product that is designed deliberately to fulfill a unique consumer need.
From there, the test logically flows into determinations of whether the
entity sold the product and, if so, whether the entity added economic
value to the relevant product under the terms in the WPLA.
The value-added test does not alter Washington product liability
standards, nor does it derive its utility from standards not previously
mentioned in Washington case law. It does, however, make use of
preexisting standards and thereby create a means by which Washington
courts can effectively deal with the problem of assigning manufacturer
liability under the WPLA. At the end of the day, a more consistent
standard benefits both consumers and producers by allowing swift, just
compensation from the entity in the best position to prevent the defect in
the specific product that the consumer purchased.
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